to the corporate interest in reputation. While the Court's case law in both of these areas is unclear, the argument advanced here is that there is no good justification for extending a right to reputation to corporations under either Article. However, given the oftenhaphazard approach the Court takes to developing its interpretation of Convention rights, there is a risk that it will uncritically extend a Convention right to reputation to companies in the future.
Introduction
During the debates leading to the Defamation Act 2013, the fact that corporations were entitled to sue for libel or slander to protect their reputations was a controversial issue, and 'preventing corporates from suing [was] a primary goal of some libel reformers.' 1 In bearing legal entities'; 9 without enforceable rights they would be unable to pursue their objects. The existence of corporate rights under a supranational treaty such as the ECHR has the benefits of promoting some uniformity across jurisdictions, and of protecting those rights against the arbitrary use of state power. 10 It might also be pointed out that some of the Court's most important jurisprudence on freedom of expression has resulted from claims brought by for-profit media companies. 11 But the rights of companies need not be precisely the same as those available to human beings, 12 so the protection of individuals' reputations under the Convention 13 does not necessarily entail that companies will be entitled to the same protection.
Legal uncertainty
The most important ECtHR decision for the purposes of this paper is Firma EDV Für Sie,
EfS Elektronische Datenverarbeitung Dienstleistungs GmbH v Germany ('EDV').
14 The applicant, a 'legal person founded exclusively for business purposes', 15 argued that its rights under Art 8 and A1P1 had been violated by the German courts' failure to protect it against statements made by another private party that had 'tarnished [its] reputation and ruined its economic foundation.' 18 . 13 See text to notes 70-88. 14 App no 32783/08 (ECtHR, 2 September 2014) ('EDV'). 15 Ibid, para 31. 16 Ibid, para 18.
Article 8 applies ' . 17 The application was declared inadmissible because the Court considered that the domestic courts had balanced the competing interests under Arts 8 and 10 reasonably, acting within their margin of appreciation.
18
The Court also left open the question 'whether a company's reputation and goodwill constitute "possessions"' under A1P1, thereby attracting the protection of that Article, on the grounds that the applicant's complaint under A1P1 raised no separate issues from its complaint under Art 8.
19
More recently, the Court has assumed that Art 8 protects corporate reputation in two decisions on the Art 10 right to freedom of expression. In the first, Magyar
Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete v Hungary, the applicants complained that their Art 10 rights had been violated by the imposition of liability for their publication of defamatory statements about a company. 20 The Court stated again that 'it is not necessary to decide whether the plaintiff company could justifiably rely on its right to reputation, seen from the perspective of Article 8', and proceeded on the assumption that it could.
21
In the second of these cases, Ärztekammer für Wien v Austria, the Court did not even acknowledge that Art 8 might not protect the reputation of a corporation. It simply noted that the applicant had 'made a public statement which affected the reputation of [a] company', and that the right to reputation 'is a right which is protected by Article 8', before assessing whether the Austrian courts had appropriately balanced the competing interests under Arts 8 and 10.
22 17 Ibid, para 23. 18 Ibid, para 29. 19 Ibid, para 34. 20 If the ECtHR were to decide that corporate reputation does fall within the scope of either right, though, the approach of the English courts would be likely to change to reflect that decision. While s 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 only requires judges to 'take into account', rather than to follow, relevant Strasbourg decisions, in practice English courts are likely to follow the ECtHR's interpretation of the Convention.
31
Given the ECtHR's decision in EDV, this article focuses on the possible existence of a right to corporate reputation under Art 8 or A1P1. 32 But first I discuss the relevance of corporate reputation to Article 10, Paragraph 2 ('Art 10(2)') of the Convention.
Article 10(2)
Art 10(2) sets out the permissible justifications a member state can offer for restricting the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Art 10(1). One such justification is 'for the protection of the reputation … of others'. This is the only explicit reference to reputation in the Convention. As such, the ECtHR has historically treated reputation as relevant to the Convention only in the context of Art 10(2). 
32
Lord Lester's evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill also argued that preventing companies from suing in defamation 'would be a breach of Article 6 read with Article 14' (Joint Committee, Evidence (n 4) 19). Lord Lester's argument was that the Art 6 right to a fair trial guarantees effective access to the courts for the determination of applicants' 'civil rights and obligations' (Golder v United Kingdom App no 4451/70 (ECtHR, 21 February 1975) para 36) and that failing to allow companies the right to sue in defamation would constitute discrimination in the protection of that right of access, contrary to Art 14. However, Art 6 only guarantees a right of access to the courts in respect of existing domestic 'civil rights': it does not guarantee the existence of any particular substantive right in domestic law: Roche 
Importance
Whether corporate reputation is protected by a Convention right, rather than being merely a permissible justification for restricting expression, is important for three main reasons.
Firstly, the answer to that question will affect the protection of corporate reputation in Convention right to corporate reputation would entail that companies could apply to the ECtHR alleging a violation of that right by a member state.
Effect on domestic protection
The level of protection given to a corporate claimant's reputation in a domestic defamation case would be higher if that interest falls within the scope of a Convention right than if it does not.
If no Convention right protects corporate reputation, then the reputational interests in a company's defamation claim will be relevant only as a justification for restricting the defendant's expression under Art 10(2). To comply with the terms of Art 10(2) a restriction on expression must be 'necessary in a democratic society', which entails that it addresses a 'pressing social need', and is 'proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued'. 38 The necessity of a restriction on expression 'must be convincingly In contrast, if the reputational interests in a corporate defamation claim fall within the scope of Art 8, then the claim would need to be resolved using the very different approach described by Lord Steyn in Re S (a child). 44 The court must engage in a balancing exercise, assessing the relative importance of the parties' rights in the circumstances of the case, from an initial position of presumptive parity between those rights. 45 The enhanced protection offered to reputation as part of the [140] : Warby J considered it to be 'clear' that the applicability of Art 8 to a defamation claim 'does make a difference in principle to the approach that should be taken.' However, in the circumstances of that case, it would not have affected his finding on liability: [148] .
Changes to the substantive law that are favourable to corporate claimants might also have important consequences outside the courts; that is, they risk aggravating the law's chilling effect on speech about corporations.
Convention obligations
Another important consequence of the existence of a Convention right to corporate reputation would be the imposition on member states of obligations with respect to its protection.
If corporate reputation is not a Convention right in itself, it cannot give rise to any Convention duties. As such, its protection in domestic law would be permissible but not required.
59
This can be seen in the ECtHR's judgment in Steel. Holding that a member state 'enjoys a margin of appreciation as to the means it provides under domestic law to enable a company to challenge the truth, and limit the damage, of allegations which risk 
Right to apply to the European Court of Human Rights
Finally, the existence of a Convention right to corporate reputation would allow companies to apply to the ECtHR alleging a violation of that right. 66 Corporations, including for-profit companies, are considered to be 'nongovernmental organisations'
under Art 34 of the Convention, and therefore have standing to apply to the Court claiming to be victim to a rights violation. 67 The discovery of a right to individual reputation under Art 8 of the Convention 'permit[ted] disgruntled libel claimants to apply to the Strasbourg court to contest the perceived failure of domestic laws to ensure respect for the right to reputation.' 68 The same would be true of a Convention right to corporate reputation.
Summary
Whether companies can claim a Convention right to reputation has important implications for the ongoing application, and any future reform, of English defamation law. It may be that the view that removing the right to sue from companies 'would be at risk of being incompatible' with the Convention 69 prevented that option from being taken in the 2013
Act, or at least prevented it from being seriously considered. As such, it is important to clarify the possible existence of a Convention right to corporate reputation. The following sections attempt to do so, addressing first Art 8 and then A1P1.
Article 8 Individual reputation under Article 8
Art 8(1) of the Convention does not explicitly include a right to reputation:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
In fact, the explicit reference to 'honour and reputation' in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on which Art 8 of the ECHR was based, 'was deliberately omitted from Article 8'. 70 Notwithstanding the drafting history, however, the ECtHR has decided that the right to reputation falls within the scope of Art 8. In all of these cases, the right to reputation was referred to as an 'aspect', 'part', or 'element' of the right to private life protected by Art 8, with no explanation as to why that was suddenly the case. 74 The first attempt to explain, rather than simply assert, the protection of reputation under Art 8 was made in Judge Loucaides' concurring opinion in 'personal identity', no 'psychological integrity', no 'relationships with other human beings', no dignity, and no personal autonomy. 138 As such, there is no good theoretical reason for the Court to extend the protection of reputation under Art 8 to corporate applicants.
As noted above, the cases in which the Court has extended other Art 8 rights to companies have all involved a state's breach of its negative obligations.
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In these cases, the Court's reasons for imposing obligations tend to focus on the importance of maintaining the rule of law and preventing the arbitrary use of government power: for example, Marius
Emberland notes that rule of law arguments were 'essential' to the Court's decision to extend the Art 8 protection of 'home' to a corporate applicant in Société Colas Est v
France. 140 As such, the rationales behind the Court's extension to corporations of Art 8 rights other than reputation are also inapplicable to the interest in corporate reputation in the context of defamation law.
141
Unfortunately, in the cases in which the Court has entertained the possibility that corporate reputation might fall within the scope of Art 8, it has relied on similarly vague reasoning to that which it employed in its earliest cases on the protection of individual reputation. The Court has simply asserted that the concept of 'private life' in Art 8 'encompasses' reputation; 142 or that the right to reputation is 'part of the right to respect for private life'. 143 These assertions, when employed in those early cases, were deficient in explaining the link between reputation and private life. They remain so in the context of the interest in corporate reputation.
Other arguments in favour of Article 8 protection Eileen Weinert, although not in support of the Court's decision in EDV, suggests that 'respect for the right to reputation appears to have crept in to art 8 through the back door and if that state of affairs is accepted, it is no great stretch to afford the protection to companies who are, after all, entitled to protect their goodwill.' 144 Hugh Tomlinson, similarly, considers it 'perhaps unsurprising' that the Court would find a corporate right to reputation to exist under Art 8, given its previous case law on corporate privacy rights. 145 This may be correct. 146 But whether such a finding would be surprising has no bearing on whether it would be legally or conceptually appropriate.
The second strand of Weinert's statement -that companies are 'entitled to protect their goodwill' -seems to presume that a company's interest in its goodwill might somehow be relevant to Art 8. Oliver makes a similar argument: noting the protection of personal reputation under Art 8, he suggests that 'Logically, the same should apply to businesses, since if their reputation is tarnished, they can be ruined.' 147 It is obviously plausible to argue that a business might be ruined by reputational harm, but that does not mean that this harm is relevant to the Art 8 right to private life. As Mullis and Scott argue:
The dimension of reputation that is appropriately conceived as a property interest is not unimportant, but there must be real concerns over affording it protection 144 Weinert (n 119) 52. 145 Tomlinson (n 57). 146 See text to notes 201-210. 147 Oliver (n 109) 313.
under Article 8 when it is inherently an extrinsic, perhaps a financial, form of harm.
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One final argument, also put forward by Tomlinson, is that 'The extension of the right would mean that defamation cases brought by both companies and individuals could be considered within the same analytical framework.' 149 It is not clear why Tomlinson thinks this would result in an 'improvement in analytical clarity', 150 given that individual and corporate claimants are already subject to different rules in English defamation law.
Tomlinson also suggests that the balancing exercise between Arts 8 and 10 would operate differently in cases involving corporate claimants, reflecting the different nature of their reputational interests. 151 If taking those different characteristics into account at the balancing stage would not result in a lack of 'analytical clarity', then it is difficult to see why taking them into account at a previous stage -when determining which, if any, Convention rights are engaged -would be problematic.
Summary
I have argued in this section that there is no good justification in the ECtHR jurisprudence on the protection of individual reputation under Art 8 for the Court to extend that protection to corporations, and that it would be conceptually inappropriate for it to do so.
In the next section, I consider the potential applicability of A1P1 to corporate reputation, as an alternative to Art 8. 148 Mullis and Scott (n 1) 40-41. 149 Tomlinson (n 57). 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. As legal persons are explicitly referred to as beneficiaries of A1P1 rights, the key question here is whether corporate reputation can be considered a 'possession', thereby falling within the scope of A1P1. I argue in this section that corporate reputation is not a possession for this purpose, and should not be protected by A1P1.
Goodwill
The concept of 'possessions' in A1P1 is not limited to physical things: 'certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as "property rights", and thus as "possessions"'. 153 Since corporate reputation is often described as an intangible asset in its own right, 154 or an element of the intangible asset 'goodwill', 155 there is at least a plausible argument that it might constitute a 'possession' for the purposes of A1P1.
152 EDV (n 14) para 34. In the first case on the protection of goodwill under A1P1, Van Marle v The Netherlands, the applicants complained of a state action that they alleged had caused a diminution in 'the value of the goodwill of their accountancy practices'. 161 The Court held that the 'right to goodwill' claimed by the applicants 'may be likened to the right of property' in A1P1, because 'by dint of their own work, the applicants had built up a clientele; this had in many respects the nature of a private right and constituted an asset and, hence, a possession'. thus constitute assets and therefore possessions' 163 is so unclear as to be almost meaningless.
The Court's jurisprudence identifying goodwill as a possession also seems to conflict with a related line of cases in which it has held that a loss of future income will not engage A1P1, because that Article 'does not … guarantee the right to acquire property'. 164 For example, in Ian Edgar (Liverpool) Ltd v UK, the Court ruled that the applicant's claim to property in goodwill 'based upon the profits generated by the business' was in substance a complaint of a 'loss of future income', and therefore fell outside the scope of A1P1. 165 This apparent conflict has caused problems for English courts attempting to interpret this strand of the ECtHR's case law.
166

Marketability
The interpretation that has been preferred by the English courts is that goodwill only constitutes a possession in its own right if it is capable of being sold by the applicant. However, it is not necessary to accept the marketability interpretation to reach the conclusion that the financial value of a company's reputation lies in its effect on future earnings, 174 and therefore that it should not be considered a 'possession' under A1P1. In Moses LJ's judgment, the lack of A1P1 protection for future income precluded reputation from falling within the article's scope:
[Reputation] has no economic value other than being that which a professional man may exploit in order to earn or increase his earnings for the future. The Court's treatment of goodwill as a possession developed in cases brought by individual applicants in respect of a loss of goodwill in their professional practices. 178 In subsequent decisions, the Court has described this line of cases as establishing that 'goodwill may be an element in the valuation of a professional practice'. 179 The Court has sometimes referred to the goodwill of businesses in cases involving the withdrawal of, or refusal to grant, licences; 180 but in Malik it stated that in these cases it 'has tended to regard as a "possession" the underlying business or professional practice in question.'
181
In other words, when identifying 'goodwill' as a possession, the Court has in fact been protecting the contribution made by that goodwill to the value of a distinct asset -a business or professional practice -owned by the applicant. Where goodwill in that sense is injured, the result is a fall in the value of the relevant asset, which can sensibly be described as an interference with the applicant's property in that asset.
In contrast, whenever a corporate applicant has complained of a loss of its own goodwill, the Court has rejected its application on the basis that it amounted to a complaint of loss of future income. 182 The reputation of a company attaches to the company itself; any value that it has contributes to the value of the company, not to any of the company's assets. As such, a fall in the value of a company's reputation ultimately manifests itself as a fall in the value of the company itself. This cannot represent a diminution of the value of an asset owned by the company, because the company cannot own itself. 183 The proper claimants in respect of a fall in the value of a company would be its shareholders or owners. 184 Since a claim in libel can only properly be brought to protect the reputation of the claimant, not of the claimant's assets, 185 on this interpretation of the Strasbourg jurisprudence the corporate interest in reputation protected in defamation law cannot constitute a possession under A1P1.
Other arguments
Oster argues that corporate reputation is, or ought to be, encompassed by A1P1. 186 One strand of his argument is based on Robert Post's theory identifying three conceptions of reputation that have influenced the development of defamation law: reputation as property, honour, and dignity. 187 Noting that companies can make no sensible claim to
Post's conceptions of reputation as honour or dignity, Oster argues that 'it is a distinctive feature of a company's suit for defamation that it may exclusively be explained by the conception of reputation as property.'
188
But the observation that a corporation has no claim to dignity or honour only leads to the conclusion that its reputation can exclusively be conceptualised as property if one accepts
Post's three conceptions as coherent and exhaustive. Post himself did not claim that his conceptions were exhaustive. 189 Further, there are good reasons to reject the characterisation of corporate reputation as in itself a form of property. For example, it is not alienable separately from the company to which it attaches, and alienability is seen by some as a core characteristic of property. 190 The fact that a good reputation has pecuniary value to a company does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it should be characterised as a form of property. 191 In English law, although a company's goodwill is in some circumstances its property, not all aspects of a company's reputation count as goodwill. 192 For example, goodwill is treated as a property interest in the tort of passing off, but 'mere reputation … does not by itself constitute … property' in the context of that tort. 193 More importantly, the characterisation of corporate reputation as property, whether in theory or in domestic law, is not determinative of whether it is a 'possession' under A1P1.
The concept of 'possessions' that dictates the scope of A1P1 protection is autonomous, and does not necessarily reflect the position in domestic law. 194 Van Marle itself is a good example: the ECtHR in that case was unswayed by the state's argument that in Dutch law 'there was no such thing as a "right to goodwill" which could be regarded as property'.
195
There would be even less reason for the Court, if asked to decide whether corporate reputation is a possession under A1P1, to base its decision on the interest's fit with the conceptions of reputation described by Robert Post.
It might also be pointed out that, in common with corporate Art 8 rights, to date the Court has only protected goodwill under A1P1 in cases where the interference in question resulted directly from state action. 196 If a right to corporate reputation is found to exist under A1P1, then it will only affect English defamation law if it gives rise to positive obligations. As argued with respect to Art 8, this may make it less likely that the ECtHR will find a corporate right to reputation to exist in the context of a defamation dispute, but it is probably not a barrier to the existence of the right.
197
Summary A1P1 does not protect corporate reputation. This is either because a company's reputation is not 'marketable'; because its financial value lies in its effect on future earnings, which are unprotected by A1P1; or because it makes no contribution to the value of a distinct asset owned by the company. The characterisation of reputation as 'property', either in theory or domestic law, should not override these arguments.
Conclusion: cause for concern
I have argued that there is no good justification, whether in the ECtHR's jurisprudence or in theory, for the existence of a Convention right to corporate reputation. Nevertheless, the EDV decision indicates that the Court is willing to entertain the possibility that it will find such a right to exist in the future. The apparent ease with which the Court has assumed that corporate reputation might fall within the scope of Art 8 or A1P1 should be concerning. The discovery of a Convention right to corporate reputation could have important consequences for English corporate defamation law, both in terms of its current application and in its effect on future reform efforts.
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If found to exist under Art 8 specifically, a right to corporate reputation could even make English defamation law incompatible with the Convention, because of the Defamation Act 2013, sub-s 1(2), which requires for-profit corporate claimants to show 'serious financial loss', or a likelihood thereof, to succeed in a defamation action. The ECtHR has ruled that reputational harm will only engage Art 8 subject to a threshold of seriousness, and this threshold would also apply to corporate applicants. 199 But the threshold adopted by the ECtHR relates to the seriousness of the 'attack' on reputation, whereas the sub-s 1(2) threshold relates to the existence or probability of financial consequences of a reputational injury. It is difficult to see the ECtHR, treating a company's reputation as 'part of' its right to private life, requiring it to show a distinct category of consequential loss for an attack on its reputation to engage Art 8.
Further, and to my mind more importantly, there is a strong interest in the ECtHR's interpretation of Convention rights being conceptually coherent, both to protect the Court's legitimacy and ability to influence domestic rights protection, 200 and as a matter of principle. As such, a Convention right to reputation should not be extended to corporations unless there is a strong justification for doing so.
But, despite the arguments against a Convention right to corporate reputation made above, it is not implausible to think that the Court might find such a right to exist: it has form in extending Convention rights to corporate applicants without sufficiently considering whether doing so would be conceptually appropriate. 201 The different characteristics of human and legal persons should encourage caution in extending to the latter fundamental rights designed with the former in mind. The ease with which the Court has abandoned this caution in the past should raise concerns regarding the likelihood that it will properly take into account the nature of corporate reputation if it is asked to decide whether that interest falls within the scope of a Convention right in the future.
